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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
procedural provisions of the service insurance act, as well as of the substan-

tive provisions, should be guided by the deceased's intent.2 3 That intent
has been held powerful enough to controvert rights established by state
law; 24 and, as mentioned before, special procedure may obtain under particular waivers of governmental immunity.25 Actually, the prior cases as well
as the instant case entertain those matters essential in carrying out the
serviceman's intent, but nowhere do the opinions acknowledge that intent
to be controlling.

TAXATION

-

MOVABLE TANGIBLES -

TAXING SITUS

Plaintiff's interstate barges were registered in Ohio, but stopped there
only for fuel and repairs. Ohio levied an ad valorem personal property tax
on the full value of the vessels. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, held, that the possibility of subjection to a second tax by the
states in which the barges have acquired taxing sitii through physical presence' precludes collection by the domiciliary state of more than its proportionate share. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 72 Sup. Ct. 309 (1952).
Since the establishment of federal supremacy over navigable waters, 2 ill
order to protect shipping against multiple taxation3 the courts have had to
decide what constitutes a tax situs for vessels.4 A state may tax tangible
personal property found within its borders, " even against a domiciliary of
another state.0 However, a distinguishable situation arises where the prop23. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F.2d 494 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 342 U.S.
850 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 87 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1937); Golden v. United
States, 91 F. Supp. 950 (M.D. Ala. 1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1951); Jadin v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 589 (D. Wis. 1947); Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp.
657 ('W.D. Mo. 1946).
24. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), reversing 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201
P.2d 837 (1949).
25. See notes 10, 15 supra.
1. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
2. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat, I (U.S. 1824).
3. U.S. Consr. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925);
Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905); Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
4. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473
(1925) (not applicable to intangibles, although in Texas v. Florida the Supreme Court
took it upon itself to determine a domicile from the evidence in the record).
5. Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); WValworth v.
Harris, 129 U.S. 355 (1888).
6. Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905); Pullman's Palace.Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886); Brown v.
Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1884); The State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875);
Tappan v. Merchant's Bank, 19 Wall. 490 (U.S. 1873); Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15
Wall. 300 (U.S. 1868).

CASES NOTED
erty is movable in interstate" and foreign transportation. Which state9 or
states 10 can tax, and how much? Where several states have legitimate
claims their aggregate may equal only one tax." Each is allowed a proportionate share based upon the amount of business done in that state.' 2 In
such cases, the domiciliary state is excluded to the extent that the other
states have legitimate claims.1 3 However, even if the property is not in the
domiciliary state during the taxing year, so long as it has not acquired a
4
taxing situs elsewhere, the domiciliary state may claim full taxing powers.'
What constitutes such presence in the state as to make it a taxing
situs?' 5 A state may tax railroad cars actually in the state during the taxing
year in the proportion that the company's trackage within the state bears to
its total trackage. 1 Those cars which are wholly out of the state during
the taxing year are exempt,I' except that the domiciliary state may tax them
if they do not acquire another taxing situs.'5
The cases of personal property taxes on aircraft are distinguishable from
those dealing with railroad rolling stock. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota,' it was held that aircraft which operated out of the domiciliary
state could be taxed there exclusively, and no other taxing situs could be
acquired. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson said that a state
7. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905); Leloup v.
Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1887); Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 127 U.S. 117 (1887);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Att y. Gen. of Mass., 125 U.S. 530 (1887); Gloucester Ferry
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1884); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881);
The Delaware Railroad Tax Case, 18 Wall. 206 (U.S. 1873); Morgan v. Parham, 16
Wall. 471 (U.S. 1872).
8. Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1854).
9. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
10. Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); Delaware Railroad Tax Case, 18 Wall. 206 (U.S. 1873).
11. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944) (concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
12. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Pullman's PalaceCar Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
13. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944) (concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Black, supported in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336

U.S. 169 [1949]).

14. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944) (airplanes by their
nature can have only one taxing situs); New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Miller,
202 U.S. 584, 597 (1906) (Mr. justice Holmes said, " . . . the state of origin remains
the permanent situs of the property, notwithstanding its occasional excursions to foreign
parts."); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906) (this case had two
points: that the domiciliary state is the taxing state where no other taxing situs is acquired,
and that a ship used for inland commerce does not acquire another taxing situs-which
was overruled in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S, 169 [1949]).
15. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302 (1944) (concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson).
16. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); Pullman's
Palace.Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); cf. New York Cent. & Hudson River
R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 597 (1906).
17. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); New York Cent.
& Hudson River R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 597 (1906).
18. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); New York Cent. & Hudson River RR.
v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
19. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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could not tax for the use of the air over its territory, for the same reason that
it could not tax for the use of the high seas. 20 Consequently, he maintained,
the test for computing proportionate mileage of the airline's routes, as in
the railroad cases, 21 is not applicable. Since no taxing situs could be acquired
elsewhere, aircraft are held to be taxable at the home base.
An analysis of ship-taxing cases must start with Southern Pacific Co. v.
Kentucky.2 ' There the Court allowed the domiciliary state to collect on the
full value of ships trading on the high seas, even though they never touched
the territory of Kentucky. The general rule is that merely stopping for
loading or unloading, or for fuel or repairs, does not constitute a sufficient
basis to make the port-state a taxing situs, 23 and consequently none of the
ships could claim a taxing situs outside Kentucky. Distinguishing the cases,
the Court found in Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia,"2 that a New York
ship sailing exclusively in Virginia waters is taxable by Virginia to the exclusion of New York. On the other hand, where the ship is engaged in commerce between the domiciliary and other states, merely stopping at the others,
the domiciliary remains the exclusive taxing authorityA' Finally, holding
contra, the Court here ruled that a ship in inland transportation, which
actually does business in other states, can be subjected to the proportionate
tax theory applied in railroad cases.20 rhe Court thereby created a taxing
27
situs in states which theretofore had none.
A reading of the cases fails to indicate that the Court has ever held that
the taxing power must be asserted before a taxing situs can be acquired.
Collection by a state seems to be merely evidence that it is a taxing situs.
The instant case is one where the property acquired other taxing sitil2 which
had not in fact been asserted by the authorized states. Since the percentage
of routage in Ohio waters was negligible, and other taxing sitii had been
acquired,291 Ohio must then be excluded. The barges may never be subjected
to taxation if none of the authorized states assert their rights. Plaintiff
corporation then merely receives the benefits inherent in doing business in
20. 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944).
21. Pullman's Palace-Car v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).

22. 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
23. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911); Morgan v. Parham, 16
Wall. 471 (U.S. 1872); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 Ilow. 596 (U.S. 1854).

24. 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
25. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885); Wiggins Ferry Co.
v. East St. Louis, 107 U.S 365 (1882); St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U.S.
1870); lays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1854); cf. Morgan v. Parham,
16 Wall. 471 (U.S. 1872) (domicile held to be taxing situs over the two states between
which the ship did business as passenger carrier on regular schedule).
26. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949), applying Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahom, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); Pullman's Palace-Car Co, v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 118 (1891).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S, 169 (1949), overruling Ayer
& Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906) (denying state proportionate share of
taxing authority where ships did business in state)
29. Ibid.
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a state with favorable tax conditions. The case seems to be another step
in the attempt to eliminate multiple taxation of movable tangibles, and also
to eliminate payment tinder protest and its consequent bothersome and
expensive litigation for recovery,

TAXATION-PUBLIC POLICY-DEDUCTION OF "KICKBACKS"
AS ORDINARY AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSES
Plaintiffs, opticians, deducted as ordinary and necessary business cxpenses "kickbacks," paid to doctors who prescribed the glasses, of one-third
of the retail price. Held, that such deductions are not contrary to public
policy unless they frustrate sone national or state policy which has been
defined by some governmental declaration.

Lilly v. Commissioner of Inter-

nal Revenue, 72 Sup. Ct. 497 (1952).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that in computing net income
2
there shall be allowed as deductions from gross income all the ordinary
and necessary' expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business. Certain limitations upon this general provision,
recognizing public policy, have been set forth. Criminal fines and penalties
are not deductible because to do so would in effect permit the taxpayer to

mitigate the punishment of the law.4 Legal fees spent in behalf of defending suits for violations of state and federal statutes have been disallowed
as not being "ordinary and necessary," while money spent in defending tort
actions has been allowed.- Commercial bribes have been disallowed as not
being "necessary" because the payor has an adequate remedy at law, and to
allow such accessions would be against public policy.6 Similarly, sums paid
by a corporate taxpayer under contingent fee contracts are not allowed, since
such sums are paid in execution of contracts which are void as against public policy.7
The instant decision, 8 one of first inprcssion, demonstrates the Supreme
Court's reluctance to permit lower courts to decide at their discretion what
I. INT. REV. COnk § 2 3 (a)(I)(A). 43 STAT. 269 (1924), 26 U.S.C. § 23(2)
(i) (1940).
2.4. NIERTON, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.07 (Rev. ed. 1948)
("Ways of conduct and forms of speech prevailing in the business world will usually
furnish a reliable guide in determining whether the particular expense is an ordinary
expense of the business.").
3. Welch v. Commissioner, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) ("Ordinarily, an expense will be
considered necessary where the expenditure is appropriate and helpful in the development
of the taxpayer's business.").
4. Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931);
Great Northern R.R. v. Commissioner 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
855 (1930).
5. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); ltelvering v. Hampton, 79
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
6. Kelley-Deipsey & Co. v.Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 351, 355 (1934).
7. Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corp. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
8.Lilly v. Commissioner, 72 Sup. Ct. 497 (1952).

